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ARTICLES
VANITY OF VANITIES:
"SUBSIDY" PUBLISHING AFTER STELLEMA
JonathanL. Kirsch*
Vanity publishing is to legitimate publishing as loansharking is to
banking.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Oh Kiml My Son! My Sonl is Frank Stellema's heartrending account
of the illness and death of his son. Like thousands of other aspiring authors, Stellema was unable to find a commercial publisher. Therefore, he
paid Vantage Press, a so-called "vanity publisher," to publish his book.
And, like thousands of others, Stellema discovered that there is much
less to "vanity publishing" than meets the eye.
"They baited me with a phony brochure and a lot of promises,"
Stellema testified before the jury in a Manhattan trial court in April
1990. "They took my $6,000 and sent me 50 copies of my book, all of
which I had to sell myself."2 Frank Stellema is the lead plaintiff in Stellema v. Vantage Press,3 a class-action lawsuit against Vantage Press, Inc.
and two of its corporate officers, Arthur Kleinwald and Martin Littlefield. Nearly thirteen years after the case was filed, the jury returned a
$3.5-million punitive damages verdict against defendants on a claim that
* Jonathan L. Kirsch is an attorney in private practice with the firm of Kirsch & Mitchell in Century City, specializing in book publishing and other intellectual property matters.
0 1992 by Jonathan L. Kirsch.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Lisa K. Garner for her indispensable
assistance in the research and preparation of this article. The author also appreciates the
assistance of counsel in the Stellema case, including Arthur J. Jacobs and Alfred E. Smith,
counsel for plaintiff, and Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr. of Bower & Gardner, counsel for defendants,
for their generosity in making available various pleadings and exhibits for use in connection
with this article.
I. DAN POYNTER, THE SELF PUBLISHING MANUAL (5th ed. 1989) (quoting Martin J.
Baron).
2. Jonathan Yardley, For Victims of the Vanity Press Scam, A Small Victory, WASH.
Posr, Apr. 16, 1990, at B2.
3. Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., No. 23585/77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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Vantage defrauded the authors merely by calling itself a publisher.4
The lesson of Stellema is that the legal definition of publisher-and
the duties owed by a publisher to its authors-are moving toward ever
greater clarity and specificity. A company that calls itself a publisher is
now under court-mandated duties to edit and promote in good faith.
And, as a practical matter, the verdict in Stellema may destroy the vanity
publishing industry, or at least the illusions on which it has thrived for so
long.

II.

TOWARD A LEGAL DEFINITION OF "PUBLISHER"

As a threshold matter, we must ask how "publisher" is defined in
legal sources. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a publisher is:
One who by himself or his agent makes a thing publicly known.
One whose business is the manufacture, promulgation, and sale
of books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, or other literary
productions. One who publishes, especially one who issues, or
causes to be issued, from the press, and offers for sale or circulation matter printed, engraved or the like.5
Significantly, the function of a publisher as defined in Black's Law
Dictionary goes far beyond the mere manufacture of books: a publisher
must also "promulgat[e]" the books and offer them for "sale or
circulation." 6
Similarly, the legal definition of "publish" ("[t]o make public; to circulate; to make known to people in general") 7 carefully distinguishes between printing and publishing: "To 'publish' a newspaper ordinarily
means to compose, print, issue, and distribute it to the public, and especially its subscribers, at and from a certain place. To 'print' may therefore refer only to the mechanical work of production... and constitutes
a narrower term than publish."'
Thus, the crucial inquiry in the legal definition of publishing is
whether the so-called publisher merely produces a book-that is, per4. Interrogs. to the Jury and Verdict Sheet, Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., No. 23585/
77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). The actual amount of compensatory damages was to be the subject of
a hearing after the jury decided in favor of plaintiffs on liability and punitive damages. However, the hearing on compensatory damages never occurred because the lawsuit was settled.
Telephone Interview with Arthur J. Jacobs, Esq., lead counsel for plaintiffs in Stellema (Apr.
13, 1992).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (6th ed. 1990).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id (citing In re Monrovia Evening Post, at 1017, 1019 (Cal. 1926); In re Publishing
Docket in Local Newspaper, 187 S.W. 1174, 1175 (Mo. 1913)).
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forms or arranges for the typesetting, printing and binding of a work of
authorship into book form--or goes further and places the book into
commercial distribution to the public. The very same distinction is at the
heart of Stellema, where plaintiffs maintained that Vantage Press, merely
by calling itself a publisher, engaged in an act of fraudulent misrepresentation because it made no real efforts to distribute the books that it produced at the expense of its authors.
III.

TOWARD

A "DUTY

TO PUBLISH":

A

SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS

CASE LAW ON THE LEGAL DUTIES OF THE BOOK
PUBLISHER

It is telling that, with the exception of Stellema and the venerable
case of Exposition Press v. Federal Trade Commission,9 virtually all reported appellate cases in the publishing industry arise from disputes between an author and a publisher engaged in "trade" or other forms of
commercial publishing-that is, a publisher whose business is the production, distribution and sale of books for profit through the book trade.
It is significant, too, that recent case law in the publishing industry
has established the clear and unambiguous duty of the publisher to do
not only what the contract expressly provides, but to fulfill the implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing by going beyond the technical
requirements of the contract.
A.

Implied Duties of the Book Publisher

The customary publishing contract is a fairly straightforward transaction in which the author grants the right to publish his or her work of
authorship--usually in the form of an assignment or exclusive license of
copyright-in exchange for the payment of royalties. Virtually all such
contracts permit the publisher to make unilateral and subjective decisions on the acceptability of the manuscript, the "style and manner" in
which it is published, and the extent to which the book is advertised and
promoted, if at all.
However, the courts have applied the familiar concept of the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in a manner that sharply
limits the discretion of the publisher. An emerging line of authoritymost of which comes from the Second Circuit and the appellate courts of
the state of New York, the traditional locus of the book publishing industry-is increasingly protective of the contractual rights of authors, and
9. 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961).
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imposes not only an amorphous standard of "good faith" but specific and
articulable duties on the publisher.
The law has long held that a publisher must act in good faith in
availing itself of the contractual right to reject a manuscript. The venerable case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,10 a law school classic,
establishes the implied duty to an exclusive licensee in intellectual property "to use reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into existence.""
Even the most recent cases hark back to the elegant
formulations of the old case: "The law has outgrown its primitive stage
of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and
every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A promise may be
lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,'
imperfectly expressed."' 2
Thus, for example, in Random House v. Gold,13 Random House and
novelist Herbert Gold entered into a four-book contract, which Random
House later sought to cancel by rejecting the manuscript of Gold's third
book after reviewing the poor financial performance of the first two
books under the contract.' 4 The United States District Court held that a
publisher is entitled to reject a manuscript on financial considerations "if
it acts in good faith."' 5 But the court suggested that a different result
would be reached if a plaintiff-author could adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that the publisher's evaluation of the manuscript as unsatisfactory
was not held honestly and in good faith. 6
Then, in HarcourtBrace Jovanovich v. Goldwater,17 the district court
went further by suggesting that "good faith" alone is not enough: a publisher must engage in some minimum level of review and response before
rejecting a manuscript. Specifically, the court held that the publisher
breached its contract with Barry Goldwater and ghostwriter Stephen
Shadegg by rejecting the manuscript of Goldwater's ghostwritten
memoirs without first explaining why it was dissatisfied with the manuscript or affording the authors an opportunity to rewrite.'" Although the
publishing contract required that the manuscript be "satisfactory to pub10. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
11. Id. at 215.
12. Mellencamp v. Riva Music, Ltd., 698 F. Supp. at 1154, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 188 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (emphasis in original). See also
Havel v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 445 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
13. 464 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1979).
14. Id. at 1308.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1309.
17. 532 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
18. Id. at 625.
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fisher in form and content,"1 9 the evidence convinced the court that Harcourt Brace had "breached its contract with Shadegg and Goldwater by
wilfully failing to engage in any rudimentary editorial work or effort,"'2
apparently because the publisher wanted to replace Shadegg with another ghostwriter.2"
The court in Harcourtfound "an implied obligation.., for the publisher to engage in appropriate editorial work,"22 consisting of "some
reasonable degree of communication with the authors, an interchange
with the authors about the specifics of what the publisher desires .... 2
The court pointedly observed that there was no need to "determine the
full extent or the full definition of the editorial work which is required of
a publisher under the contract. Here there was no editorial work. I emphasize, no editorial work."'2 4
B. "Good-Faith Editing" and the "Duty to Promote" Under Dell and
Zilg
More recently, the doctrine of "good faith and fair dealing" has
been interpreted to impose specific and quantifiable duties upon book
26
publishers in Dell PublishingCo. v. Whedon 2 5 and Zilg v. Prentice-Hall,
where, in the words of one authoritative commentator, the courts "[gave]
authors, by judicial fiat, what they have generally been unable to obtain
2
by contract negotiations." 7
1. Dell Publishing Co. v. Whedon
Dell is an author's typical nightmare come true. Julia Whedon entered into a contract with Dell in 1974 for a novel based on a twelve-page
outline. After Whedon submitted approximately half of the manuscript
to her editor at Dell in 1977, the editor expressed satisfaction with the
work-in-progress, and an additional $6,000 advance was paid as required
19. Id at 619.
20. Id at 625.
21. Id.
22. Harcourt, 532 F. Supp. at 624.
23. Id
24. Id.
25. 577 F. Supp. 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
26. 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1911 (1984).
27. Melvin Simensky, Redefining the Rights and Obligationsof Publishersand Authors, 5
Loy. ENT. L. J. 111, 127 (1985). Simensky expertly analyzes (and rather sharply criticizes)
Dell and Zilg, and concludes that the two cases "dramatically restructure the author-publisher
relationship," id. at 11, by effectively establishing a duty to "edit in good faith," id at 119,
and a concomitant "duty to promote." Id. at 127.
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by the contract on acceptance of the partial manuscript.2 8 When
Whedon delivered the completed manuscript in 1978, however, Dell informed the author that the manuscript "isn't what we expected,"'29 purported to cancel the contract, and demanded the return of the entire
$14,000 advance.3 0 Whedon later sold the manuscript to Dell's parent
company, Doubleday, and Dell sued her to recover the $14,000
advance.3 '
The court in Dell summarized the dispute in simple terms:
The sole issue in dispute is whether, before rejecting the manuscript as unsatisfactory, Dell had an implied good faith obligation to offer Whedon the opportunity to revise the manuscript,
with Dell's editorial assistance, to bring it up to publishable
standards. The court holds that Dell had such an obligation,
32
which it failed to fulfill.
2.

Zilg v. Prentice-Hall

Zilg, which also embodies an author's typical nightmare, goes considerably further than Dell in imposing affirmative duties on a publisher
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Gerard Colby
Zilg, who wrote a book about the duPont family under contract with
Prentice-Hall, claimed that his publisher failed to promote his book in
good faith at the behest of the duPont family (whom he sued for tortious
33
interference with contract).
The Prentice-Hall contract included the standard publishing-industry clause that bestows upon the publisher virtually unfettered discretion
in determining how, when, and in what quantities the book will be published, including the sole right "to determine the method and means of
advertising, publicizing, and selling the work ....
3 Zilg complained
that Prentice-Hall acted wrongfully by, among other things, reducing the
number of copies to be printed and failing to promote the book.3 5
The Second Circuit in Zilg applied the doctrine of "good faith and
fair dealing" to Prentice-Hall's obligations under the contract, and went
so far as to specify the minimum obligations of the publisher in promoting a book:
28. Dell, 577 F. Supp. at 1460.
29. Id. at 1461.

30. Id.
31. iL at 1462.
32. Id.
33. Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, 717 F.2d 671
34. Id. at 674.
35. Id. at 676.

(2d Cir. 1983).
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We think that the promise to publish must be given some content and that it implies a good faith effort to promote the book
including a first printing and advertising budget adequate to
give the book a reasonable chance of achieving market success
in light of the subject matter and likely audience.3"
According to the court in Zilg, once the book has actually been
printed and the publisher has made "a good faith effort to promote the
book initially,"" any further or "more elaborate" 3 efforts are left to the
publisher's discretion: "Once the initial obligation is fulfilled, all that is
required is a good faith business judgment."3 9 From the evidence
presented at trial, the court in Zilg concluded that Prentice-Hall had, in
fact, discharged its obligations in good faith, and the verdict in favor of
plaintiff was reversed.4°
C.

Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis

The same court that established a "duty to promote" 4 1 in Zilg, however, declined to give its imprimatur to the "duty to edit" in Doubleday
& Co. v. Curts,4 2 where the veteran actor and novice author Tony Curtis
complained that his publisher had breached its duty of good faith in rejecting the manuscript of a work titled Starstruck as unpublishable.4 3
The court in Doubleday carefully noted that a Doubleday editor had
read the "partial first draft"' of Starstruck and offered detailed suggestions--critical but encouraging-for its improvement, but the author
later delivered a complete manuscript that "ignored" 4 5 the publisher's
suggestions. Doubleday's editors concluded that the manuscript was
"'junk, pure and simple' and could not be 'edited into shape or even
rewritten into shape.' " When Curtis rejected a suggestion that he consult a "novel doctor" in order to rewrite his manuscript, Doubleday rejected the manuscript and later sued in United States District Court to
recover its advance.47
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 680.

Id.
Zilg, 577 F. Supp. at 680.
Id.
Id
Id. at 681.
763 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1985), cerL dismissed, 474 U.S. 912 (1985).
Id. at 499.
Id at 498.
Id
Id.
Doubleday, 763 F.2d at 498-99.
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Curtis counter-sued for breach of contract based on the claim that
"Doubleday's failure to provide.. . editorial services-a duty derived
from its implied obligation to perform in good faith-prevented him
from completing a satisfactory manuscript." 4 8 Curtis condemned his editor at Doubleday as "apathetic" and "incompetent," and claimed that
he was deceived by the exhortatory tone of the editor's initial letter.4 9
At trial, the district court observed that the appellate courts of New
York had not yet resolved the issue of "a duty to edit" as proposed by the
district courts in Dell Publishing Co. v. Whedon and Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich v. Goldwater, but concluded that "[e]ven if a duty to provide
editorial services is accepted as required under New York law, here,
Doubleday performed it."5 0
The court of appeal agreed. 5 The implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in a publishing contract imposes the duty "to appraise a
writing honestly" 52 and "not to mislead an author deliberately regarding
the work required for a given project."5 3 What's more, "[a] publisher's
duty to exercise good faith in its dealings toward an author exists at all
stages of the creative process." 54 However, good faith alone may be
sufficient:
Although we hold that publishers must perform honestly, we
decline to extend that requirement to include a duty to perform
skillfully. The possibility that a publisher or an editor--either
through inferior editing or inadvertence-may prejudice an author's efforts is a risk attendant to the selection of a publishing
house by a writer, and is properly borne by that party. To imply a duty to perform adequate editorial services in the absence
of express contractual language would, in our view, represent
an unwarranted intrusion into the editorial process. Moreover,
we are hesitant to require triers of fact to explore the manifold
intricacies of an editorial relationship. Such inquiries are appropriate only where contracts specifically allocate certain creative responsibilities to the publisher."
The court in Doubleday referred to the analysis in Zilg on the issue
of the "duty to promote," and concluded that the same principles apply
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 499.
Id.
Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Curtis, 599 F. Supp. 779, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Doubleday, 763 F.2d at 499.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in a discussion of the "duty to edit": The "satisfactory to publisher"
clause is intended-and properly so--to "foreclos[e] the possibility that a
publisher's editorial decision could be later questioned by a disgruntled
writer or be 'subject to second guessing ... "56
D.

Mellencamp v. Riva Music

Similarly, the rule in Zilg was noted but not broadened in Mellencamp v. Riva Music 7 where the rock 'n roll songwriter and singer John
Cougar Mellencarnp sued the music publishing companies5" to which he
had licensed the copyrights in his songs for, inter alia, breaching their
fiduciary duties "by failing to actively promote his songs and to use their
best efforts to obtain all the monies rightfully due him from third
parties. ' 9
However, the court in Mellencamp declined to extend the duties of
the publisher toward its author into the realm of a fiduciary relationship.
Specifically, the court rejected Mellencamp's argument that a publisher
owes its author a fiduciary duty as a matter of law, but affirmed the rule
that every publishing contract includes an implied promise by the publisher to use its best efforts to exploit the rights granted in the contract.
When the essence of a contract is the assignment or grant of an
exclusive license in exchange for a share of the assignee's profits
in exploiting the license, these principles imply an obligation on
the part of the assignee to make reasonable efforts to exploit the
license. [Citations omitted.] The critical point here is that a
publisher's obligation to promote an author's work is one
founded in contract rather than on trust principles.'
The Doubleday and Mellencamp cases demonstrate that the courts
are not willing to broaden the duties of the publisher to its author to
include fiduciary duties or an elaborate "duty to edit," but-at the same
time-the contractual obligations of the publisher clearly include the
56. Doubleday, 763 F.2d at 500, n.3.
57. 698 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

58. Music publishing differs from book publishing in significant respects, but the court's
shorthand reference to the contract at issue in Mellencamp applies to the typical book publishing contract as well: "In exchange for the assignment of the copyrights, Mellencamp received

a percentage of the royalties earned from the exploitation of his music." Mellencamp, 698 F.
Supp. at 1156.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1157 (citing, inter alia, Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983);
Havel v. Kelsey-Hayes, 445 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)). See also SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion Pictures, 723 F. Supp. 1053, 1070-71 (D.NJ. 1989): "(T]rust principles are implicated only in those cases where the publisher tortiously engages in infringing
conduct or deliberately tolerates infringing conduct by others."
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duty to edit "honestly" and, notably, the duty to promote.6 1 As we will
see, the inherent duty of a publisher to market and distribute is the central issue in Stellema.
IV.

"VANITY"

OR "SUBSIDY"

PUBLISHING

Unlike the publishing houses whose contracts were scrutinized in
the foregoing cases, the defendant in Stellema was a so-called "vanity"
press. At the outset, therefore, it is essential to understand the peculiar
function of a "vanity" publisher, and to distinguish between "vanity"
publishing and other kinds of self-publication in which the author pays
all or part of the cost of publication.
A self-published author is one who goes into the publishing business
on personal initiative and resources by arranging for the printing and
distribution of his or her own book. The tradition of self-publishing is an
old and honorable one; as defendants in Stellema pointed out with
charming precision in their brief in the third of three pre-trial appeals,
Tolstoy arranged for the printing of War and Peace at his own expense of
4,500 rubles.62 A self-publisher, as the term suggests, is an author who
assumes the role of publisher. Although it is common for self-publishers
to delegate the mechanics of bookmaking, the author is responsible for
the product and for its marketing. In addition, the profit generated by
the book will go to the author rather than the publisher. In vanity publishing, on the other hand, the author merely pays to have the vanity
press print the work and deliver a finished product.63
In fact, "vanity" publishing-or "subsidy" publishing, as its practitioners prefer to call it-has been referred to as "a scam of the lowest
order."' 4 The "vanity publisher" extracts a fee from aspiring authors for
producing a small edition of the author's work in book form.6 5 As the
court observed in Exposition Press, a "vanity" or "subsidy" publisher
"differs from that of most publishing houses in that normally most or all
of the expense of publishing its books is paid in advance by their
authors."6 6
But the definition in Exposition Press is misleading. The "vanity"
61. Mellencamp, 698 F. Supp. at 1157.
62. Defendants-Appellants Brief at 10, Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division-First Dep't 547 N.Y.S.2d 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (No.
38109) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief].
63. Id. at 72.
64. Yardley, supra note 2, at B2.
65. "Vanity houses sometimes deliver unbound pages to an author because the contract
did not specifically call for the book to be bound." LEONARD D. DUBOFF,GUIDE 71 (1984).
66. Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 871.
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publisher may arrange for the typesetting, printing and binding of a small
number of books-usually a few hundred copies, and sometimes as few
as fifty copies-but it does not necessarily "publish" the books in the
crucial sense of distributing them for sale. The promotional efforts of a
vanity publisher may include a small "tombstone" advertisement in the
New York Times with a listing of titles by various authors and the mailing of a few "review" copies.' But even these modest efforts are strictly
proforma, as author and book critic Jonathan Yardley has attested to in
his critique of the advertising come-on of the vanity presses:
The words vary from ad to ad, depending on the medium in
which it appears, but the message-"your book can be published, promoted and marketed"-is always the same. Yet as
the Manhattan jury found, and as over the years I have been
told by numerous people who tried vanity publication, only the
first part of it is true. Yes, the book will be published, but it
will not be promoted and it will not be marketed except in the
narrowest sense of both terms; from time to time Vantage lists
some of its titles in uninviting ads in various publications, it
sends out review copies to certain publications-which, I can
testify from a quarter-century's experience, promptly throw
them away-but as to marketing, well, that is up to the
customer.68
Indeed, no real effort is made to sell the books through commercial
channels; most authors whose books are published by vanity publishers
are responsible for their own sales.
A vanity publisher contracts to produce an author's book for a
fee, but the publisher has no financial stake in the success of the
book. The author pays all direct and indirect costs of editing,
typesetting, proofreading, and printing, plus an additional fee
that represents pure profit for the publisher. Usually the author
must market and distribute the book.69
Perhaps the most useful distinction between vanity publishing and
self-publishing was suggested by Martin J. Baron, a former editor in a
vanity publishing house, who divides the entire publishing industry into
"risk" publishers, on the one hand, and vanity publishing, on the other
hand.7" "The economics of publishing," Baron writes, "force the [risk]
67. POYNTER, supra note 1, at 21.
68. Yardley, supra note 2, at B2.
69. LEONARD D. DuBoFF, supra note 65, at 71-72.
70. MARTIN J. BARON, ON VANITY PUBLISHING, in The Publish-it-Yourself:
Tradition & How-To (Bill Henderson ed., 1973).

Literary
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publisher to ask: Will this book sell at least enough to recover costs?""'
But the vanity publisher never asks the question.
The whole mystery and art of vanity publishing is a consequence of but one fact: the author pays. Once this fact is understood, the logic of vanity publishing is immediately
comprehensible. Since the author pays for the publication of
his work, the vanity publisher will accept any manuscriptlibelous and obscene manuscripts excepted-no matter how
worthless and no matter how remote are the chances of selling
the book.7 2
Even if the author is content with obtaining a few hundred copies of
work in book form, the fact remains that it is cheaper to deal with a
commercial book manufacturer than to pay the fees demanded by a
"vanity" publisher. 7 3 As Yardley advises the aspiring author who is willing to pay to see his book in print, "[L]ook in the Yellow Pages under
74
'Printers' ....
B.

Exposition Press v. FTC

Exposition Press arose from the petition for review of a cease-anddesist order issued by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to a "vanity" publisher whose advertising claims were found by the FTC to be
deceptive. The advertisement was directed to "writers seeking a book
publisher, '75 and offered "two fact-filled, illustrated brochures [that] tell
how to publish your book, get 40% royalties, national advertising, publicity and promotion." 7
Exposition Press, like all vanity publishers, required that its authors
pay the costs of production of their books, but purported to pay "royalties" on any books that were ultimately sold. The FTC found the advertisement to be deceptive and misleading; it issued a cease-and-desist
order requiring that any representation that royalties would be paid to an
author be accompanied by "a disclosure ... that such payments do not
constitute a net return to the author but that the cost of printing, promoting, selling and distributing the book must be paid in whole or in
' 77
substantial part by the author."
71. Id.
72. Id
73. POYNTER, supra note 1.
74. Yardley, supra note 2.
75. Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 871.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 871-72.
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The opinion sheds some light on the practices of "vanity" publishing
in general: "Less than 10% of its authors recoup their investments and
derive actual profit from their writing." 78 For example, a Dr. Cleere paid
$2,100 for publication of "Hello, Hello, Hello, Doc" and was paid only
$242 in "royalties." 7 9 A Mrs. Royall paid $2,600 for "Andrew Johnson,
Presidential Scapegoat" and was paid $239 in "royalties." 80
The court in Exposition emphasized the long-standing rule that, in
evaluating "the tendency of language to deceive, the Commission should
look not to the most sophisticated readers but rather to the least,"'" and
observed that "the fact that a person has produced a manuscript does not
necessarily mean that he has any knowledge of publishers' prevailing
rates."8 2 Accordingly, the petition to review was denied, and the ceaseand-desist order was left in force. 3
Significantly, the court in Exposition noted that only the advertisement itself was alleged by the FTC to be deceptive, and only as to the
issues of royalties. 4 Any person responding to the advertisement would
receive "literature which made it clear, before any contract was made,
that the author was required to subsidize the expenses of publication." 8 5
Nevertheless, the court resolved that "it was within the Commission's
power to prohibit the initial deception." 86
Perhaps the most illuminating passages of the opinion in Exposition,
however, were found in the dissent of Circuit Judge Friendly, who discerned a powerful urge in the soul of the aspiring writer "to move into a
flame of publication." ' Although Judge Friendly would have annulled
the cease-and-desist order and allowed the advertisement to stand, his
dissent reflected upon the peculiar vulnerabilities of the author who
would respond to a vanity publisher in the first place. "Some people
think they have written books for which the world is waiting. Publishers
who must back judgment with investment take a less sanguine view. Rejection slips accumulate, 8and frustration mounts. Petitioners are in the
8
business of relieving it."$
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id at 871.
Id at 871 n.2.
Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 871 n.2.
Id at 872.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 872.
Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 873.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 875.
88. Id. at 874.
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Judge Friendly insisted that any "trifling lack of candor" 9 in the
vanity publisher's advertisement would be remedied when the brochure
(and its presumably fuller disclosures) arrives in the mailbox of the aspiring author:
Hence the only prejudices possibly suffered even by the most
wayfaring and foolish authors would be a 4 cent stamp, the depression when the brochures dissipated the temporary euphoria
of thinking their books would be published without cost, and
perhaps an occasional decision, taken with all the facts fully
disclosed, to move into a flame of publication that otherwise
would have stayed unseen.9
Exposition Press focused on a passing reference to "40% royalties"
in the advertisement of a vanity publisher. What is entirely overlooked
in Judge Friendly's dissent-and what turned out to be the crucial issue
in Stellema-is another phrase in the same advertisement: "national advertising, publicity and promotion."9 1
V.

STELLEMA V. VANTAGE PRESS

A.

Statement of the Case

Stellema was a class-action lawsuit for common-law fraud filed in
1977 against Vantage Press and two of its officers, Arthur Kleinwald and
Martin Littlefield. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of some three thousand individuals who entered into publishing agreements with Vantage
Press during the six-year period prior to the filing of the lawsuit.9 2
The case was certified as a class action in 1978 and the certification
was upheld on appeal.9 3 A subsequent motion to decertify the class was
denied and the denial was upheld on appeal. 94 Two motions for summary judgment by defendants, one in 1981 and another in 1988, were
denied."
A three-month trial by jury was held in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, County of New York, before Justice Carmen
Beauchamp Ciparick in 1990. A verdict was returned in favor of the
89. Id. at 877.
90. Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 875.
91. Id. at 871.
92. Defendants' Brief, supra note 62, at 4.
93. Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., 411 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); appeal dismissed, 47 N.Y.2d 882, 419 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1979).
94. Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., 492 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
95. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 12, Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., 547 N.Y.S.2d 558
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (No. 38109) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief].
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class on April 9, 1990.96 The case was settled by the parties in a confidential agreement which apparently provides for payment of an undisclosed sum of money by defendants in exchange for a dismissal of the
case.

97

B.

Statement of Facts

1. The Vantage Brochure
Prior to entering into a contract with Vantage Press, Frank Stellema
received a four-color, fifty-four-page brochure titled "To the Author in
Search of a Publisher," which describes what Vantage Press called "A
PRACTICAL PLAN FOR THE PUBLICATION AND PROMOTION OF YOUR BOOK." ' Although the brochure contains various
admonitions (e.g., "Can you afford to risk the investment?") 99 and caveats (e.g., "By its very nature, book publishing is a hazardous business,
and the author who subsidizes his work should be aware of the risks
involved"),"co the brochure includes fifteen consecutive pages devoted to
optimistic and enthusiastic descriptions of publicity, promotion,
reviews,
10
advertising, sales, "extra income," and "financial returns." '
Indeed, even when the brochure purports to warn against the risks
of "subsidy" publishing, the text holds out the promise of success by
stating that "sales of the average VANTAGE title vary widely. Some
books sell a few hundred copies; some sell out their entire editions; a
handful even go into second and third printings."
2. The Contract
In 1974, Stellema executed a publishing contract ("the Contract")
which incorporated by reference a so-called "Author's Promotion and
Product Report" ("the Report"). 0 2 Like conventional publishing agreements, the Vantage contract includes an assignment of copyright and a
royalty provision. 03 Unlike a traditional publishing contract, however,
96. Interrogs., supra note 4.
97. Telephone Interview with Arthur J. Jacobs, Esq., lead counsel for plaintiffs (Apr. 1,
1992).
98. VANTAGE PRESS, To THE AUTHOR N SEARCH OF A PUBLISHER, (1974), Exhibit "D"
at trial in Stellema. The author wishes to thank Arthur Jacobs and Alfred E. Smith of the
New York City Bar for providing the original exhibit and other documents for use in the
preparation of this article.
99. Id at back cover.
100. Id at 2.
101. Id at 10-35.
102. Exhibit "D" at trial in Stellema.
103. Id at 1.
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it is the author who pays the publisher at the outset; Frank Stellema paid
$5,950 to Vantage for publication of Oh Kim! My Son! My Son! "
Vantage obliged itself to deliver fifty copies to the author, and offered to sell additional copies to the author at a forty-five percent discount from "the established retail price." ' 5 (Another fifty copies are
offered "without extra charge" if the author forgoes the installment payment provision of the contract and pays the entire contract price on delivery of the signed contract.)10 6 Vantage is obliged to print and bind a
minimum of only four hundred copies."0 7
Significantly, the contract specifically and narrowly defines what efforts Vantage will undertake in promoting and distributing the work:
Sales promotion, distribution, advertising and publicity shall be
at Publishers' election and discretion as to the extent, scope and
character thereof and in all matters pertaining thereto ....
It
is specifically understood and agreed, however, that the promotion, publicity and advertising recommendations, as set forth by
the Publishers in the Author's Promotion and Production Report
...will be performed by the Publishers within a reasonable
period of time ....
It is agreed, furthermore, that the recommendations in the said Author's Promotion and Production Report represent the minimum promotion program allocated to
the said Work and will constitute the Publishers'fulland satisfactory compliance as providedfor in this agreement'0 8
The Author's Promotion and ProductionReport sets forth "the basic
steps that will be taken in behalf of your book,"'" ranging from sending
"review copies to selected newspapers, magazines, [and] specialized
sources" and "advertising in either the N.Y. Times or other leading
newspaper" to "consider[ing the] author's own ideas and utiliz[ing
them], if possible" and "study[ing] additional promotional steps after
publication.""'
The Contract and the Report were carefully drafted to define the
minimum obligations of Vantage Press in a fashion that allowed the publisher to remain in technical compliance with its own contract even if an
author's work was never placed in distribution through ordinary retail
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Contract, 32.
Id. 10.
Id 32.
Id 7.
Id. 14 (emphasis added).
Report at 5.
Id. at 1.
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channels and-like Stellema's book-achieved only a handful of sales by
dint of the author's own efforts. 1 1
3.

The Complaint

Counsel for Stellema as the representative party audaciously and
artfully sidestepped the issue of Vantage's contract boilerplate by pleading only common-law fraud and not breach of contract. Essentially, Stellema argued that the mere use of the terms "publisher" and "subsidy"
publisher by Vantage to describe itself amounted to an act of fraudulent
misrepresentation even though Vantage may have complied with the technical requirements of its own contract.
The complaint in Stellema initially consisted of four causes of action, each one based on common-law fraud. The first and third causes of
action, which are discussed here, alleged that Vantage defrauded Stellema by calling itself a "publisher" and a "subsidy publisher." The second cause of action alleged that Vantage misrepresented the services that
it purported to offer. The fourth cause of action alleged violations of a
1958 consent order issued by the Federal Trade Commission against
12
Vantage Press.1
Stellema adopted a basic definition of "publisher" which generally
reflects the legal definitions set forth above: "'Publisher' as commonly
defined and popularly understood, is a person, corporation or other entity engaged in the business of making books or other written material
13
generally available to the public.""
The complaint also alleged a set of specific marketing practices that,
according to Stellema, are representative of how book publishers market
and sell books, including sales to a substantial number of retail bookstores through sales representatives; advertising in the principal trade
journal of the publishing industry, Publishers Weekly; and participating
in the principal publishing industry convention sponsored by the American Booksellers Association." 14
Stellema also adopted a definition of "subsidy publisher" which suggests that "the term 'subsidy,' as commonly understood and used,
[means] a payment intended to defray or pay a part of the cost of an
111. Id.
112. The second cause of action, which was dismissed at trial, is noted but not discussed
here. The fourth cause of action was dismissed prior to trial. Defendants' Brief, supra note 62,
at 5; interview with Alfred E. Smith (Feb. 6, 1991).
113. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 95, at 5.
114. Defendants' Brief, supra note 62, at 6 (citing the Complaint, 11 14-16).
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undertaking."" 5 Thus, Stellema argued, any statement by Vantage Press
that it "is a subsidy publisher is fraudulent because author-customers'
'subsidies' paid for not only the entire cost of issuing the book but also
6
included a profit for Vantage.""
C. The 1989 Summary Judgment
In 1989, defendants moved for summary judgment a second time on
the grounds, inter alia, I" that the mere use of the terms "publisher" and
"subsidy publisher" by Vantage Press to describe itself was insufficient as
a matter of law to support a claim for fraud. "I By an order dated
March 17, 1989 (by Judge C. Beauchamp Ciparick), the Supreme Court
of New York County denied the Motion for Summary Judgment stating
that "there are a plethora of issues that must be tried, among which is
whether Vantage described itself as a publisher in one of its many forms
and meanings ....,, 9

On appeal from the denial of the motion for summary judgment,
defendants argued, inter alia, that "the terms 'publisher' and 'subsidy
publisher' are not actionable representations of 'fact,' "'2° and thus the
mere use of these terms by Vantage cannot support a claim for fraud.
This claim is not based on any statement of fact which is objectively verifiable as true or false, but on a subjective concept and
definition of the word "publisher," obviously chosen by, or for,
plaintiff for the sole purpose of prosecuting this lawsuit. Thus,
plaintiff contends that Vantage, while representing itself as a
publisher, is not a publisher because the services Vantage offers
to its authors are not completely congruent with plaintiff's peculiar theory of the activities in which a publisher should be
engaged' 2 ' [including sales to a substantial number of retail
bookstores through sales representatives, advertising in Publishers Weekly, and participation in the annual convention of
the American Booksellers Association].
Defendants insisted that the terms "publisher" and "subsidy pub115. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 95, at 11.
116. Id. at 12.
117. The motion for summary judgment also challenged the second cause of action for

fraud, the sufficiency of evidence of intent to defraud, and the basis for extending individual
liability to corporate officers of Vantage. Defendants' Brief, supra note 62, at 2-3. These arguments are noted but not discussed here.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 23.

120. Id. at 22.
121. Id. at 5.
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lisher" are no more than "an abbreviated means of communicating the
services which Vantage offers and which are loosely definable and variously interpretable." '2 2 In any event, defendants insisted, Stellema could
not have been misled by the use of the terms "publisher" and "subsidy
publisher" because the brochure "described the nature of Vantage's business and disclosed the particular services offered by Vantage in its publishing program," and "explicitly delineates the obligations and services
Vantage was to perform .... " 2 3
Defendants specifically attacked the reliance of Stellema on any definition of "publisher" that included an obligation to place the books of its
"author-clients" into what Stellema characterized as a "genuine and
commercially plausible" form of commercial distribution:
Permitting plaintiff to base his fraud claim on the loosely definable and variously interpretable terms of "publisher" and "subsidy" publisher permits him to claim that Vantage promised to
perform certain services, i.e., those services which plaintiff contends a "publisher" or "subsidy publisher" ought to perform
but which it, in fact, never promised to perform either in the
Brochure or the Agreement. Thus, plaintiff himself has created
1 24
the very "misrepresentations" upon which he sues.
Stellema responded that the list of particulars in the complaint was
illustrative only, and seems to concede that even a true publisher may
employ methods of promotion and distribution other than those specified
in the complaint:
While the Complaint contains an enumeration of various promotional efforts which publishers generally engage in order to
create a market for their printed works, appellants falsely and
misleadingly contend that plaintiff requires every publisher to
undertake every one of such enumerated promotional efforts.
The Complaint, however, lists the publishing activities as illustrative examples. [Citation omitted.] Plaintiffdoes not charge
that Vantage fails to meet plaintiff'speculiar concept of what a
publisher is, but rather that Vantage is not a publisher in any
objective sense. 125
The evidence adduced in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment was sufficient to establish that there were factual issues as to
whether Vantage was a publisher.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Defendants' Brief, supra note 62, at 26.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 33-34.
Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 95, at 4 (emphasis added).

294 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12

[Vantage, though it calls itself a publisher and charges substantial fees to authors for "publishing" their books, is, in fact,
virtually a book manufacturing service. As its profits are derived from fees received from its author-clients, Vantage has no
incentive to, and plaintiff has shown that it does not, in fact,
make a good faith effort to make its books generally available to
the reading public--Le., to publish them. 2 6
Indeed, Stellema argued that the strictly pro forna efforts of Vantage at promotion and distribution make it clear that Vantage Press is
not a publisher at all:
Plaintiff's evidence established that: 1)the average Vantage title appears in less than an average of 5.1 book stores-less than
.04% of the nation's 15,000 book stores; 2) over 8.7% of Vantage titles never see a book store; 3) Vantage as a matter of
policy does not print and bind books in sufficient quantity to
ever meet any kind of significant orders; 4) actual sales of Vantage books are less than nominal and are, for the most part, the
result of the authors' own promotional efforts and/or personal
purchases; 5) Vantage does not edit manuscripts so as to ensure
quality and editorial integrity; 6) Vantage has no regular and
purposeful contact with booksellers or wholesalers; 7) Vantage
regularly exercises its contractual option to terminate its "publishing agreement" with its author-customers after a two to five
year period without regard to the actual sales of the book and
even when the book is not out of print. The evidence which
plaintiff submitted shows that Vantage, in essence, does nothing
more than print and bind its customers' books in exchange for
very substantial "publication" fees. As Vantage's publishing efforts are nominal
and intended to be nominal, Vantage is not a
27
publisher.
1. The Role of Zilg in Stellema
Zilg and the related cases on implied contractual duties of publishers were not directly at issue in Stellema, a case sounding in fraud. More
pertinent to the summary judgment proceedings, for example, was a line
of authority on the issue of whether a particular representation was, in
fact, a statement of fact at all. 2 Defendants insisted that the terms
126. Id.
127. Id.at 10-11 (emphasis added).
128. See, eg., Bailey v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 47 A.D.2d 363, 367 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't

1975).
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"publisher" and "subsidy publisher" are not "objectively verifiable statements of fact," 129 and thus the use of such terms did not, as a matter of
law, constitute an actionable statement of fact under the controlling
authority.

13

1

Stellema, however, argued that "the word 'publisher' has an objective meaning which the jury may... derive from various standards in the
publishing industry,"' ''3 and relied on Zilg and other publishing cases for
the proposition that "[s]tandards in the publishing industry have been
recognized by the courts as well." 132 "Obviously, the court's statement
[in Zilg] assumes a common understanding of what it means to publish a
book, and it assumes that publishing entails a certain level and quality of
133
advertising, promotion and distribution efforts."
Defendants rejected the applicability of Zilg and related cases where
the duties of a publisher under a written contract were at issue. "This
sharply contrasts with the matter at bar, wherein Vantage set forth, with
specificity, what it would do as a 'publisher' and 'subsidy publisher.' "134
2.

Ruling on the 1989 Summary Judgment

On November 14, 1989, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of the summary judgment, and remanded the
matter for trial. The court declared that it was not persuaded that "the
various representations were not actionable as a matter of law,"' 35 and
noted that "after twelve years of litigation and numerous opportunities to
challenge the sufficiency and merit of the complaint, we are not inclined
to grant summary judgment on the eve of trial."" 6
D.

Verdict at Trial

The matter reached the jury on two causes of action only: first, the
claim that defendants defrauded Stellema by characterizing Vantage
Press as a "publisher"; and, second, the claim that defendants defrauded
Stellema by characterizing Vantage as a "subsidy publisher."1 37
129. Defendants' Brief, supra note 62, at 27.
130. Id
131. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 95, at 29.
132. Id. at 29-30.
133. Id. at 30 (citing Zilg v. Prentice Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied
466 U.S. 938 (1984); Fraser v. Doubleday & Co., 587 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Schisgall
v. Fairchild Publications, 207 Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955)).
134. Defendants' Brief, supra note 62, at 8.
135. Order dated Nov. 14, 1989.
136. Id.
137. Jury Sheet.

296 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
The jury found that Vantage Press and the other defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct merely by calling itself a "publisher," and

awarded punitive damages of $1,500,000

against Vantage Press,

$1,000,000 against Arthur Kleinwald, and $1,000,000 against Martin
38

Littlefield. 1

The following interrogatories, among others, were answered "Yes"
by the jury:
1. Has plaintiff proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that
[defendants'] statement that VANTAGE was a "publisher"
was false?
2. Has plaintiff proven by clear and convincing evidence that
when [defendants] stated VANTAGE was a "publisher" it
knew it to be false and the statement was intended (or
made) to deceive plaintiff.
3. Has plaintiff proven by clear and convincing evidence that
plaintiff reasonably relied on the statement that VANTAGE was a "publisher" and that the statement was a substantial factor in plaintiff's decision to enter into the

agreement with VANTAGE?
6.

Did [defendants] in stating that VANTAGE was a "publisher" act in a manner which was aimed at the public generally and was gross and involved high moral
culpability?139

The same set of interrogatories relating to the use of the term "subsidy publisher" were answered in the negative.'"
E.

Current Status of the Litigation

The parties in Stellema engaged in settlement discussions after the
verdict was rendered in April 1990. A formal settlement, including a
confidentiality clause, was approved by the court on June 5, 1991. The
first of seven annual settlement distributions has now been made to approximately 700 class members. As a result, no further appeals were
taken, and the case was denied any specific precedential authority.
Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants in Stellema are not
under any legal obligation to change the practices that the jury found so
138. IM
139. Interrogs. to the Jury and Verdict Sheet, filed April 9, 1990. The second cause of
action was withdrawn after plaintiffs rested. Telephone Interview with Arthur J. Jacobs, Esq.,
lead counsel for plaintiffs in Stellema (Apr. 13, 1992).
140. Id.
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objectionable. Thus ended the final chapter of a lawsuit of Dickensian
proportions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because the parties entered into a settlement that resulted in the
dismissal of the case with no further appeals, Stellema adds nothing of
direct precedential value to the law of publishing. What's more, the fact
that Stellema was pleaded and decided on principles of common-law
fraud sharply limits the applicability of the case on the ordinary practices
of commercial publishing.
Nevertheless, Stellema is a case of intense interest within the publishing industry, and the verdict is likely to have some practical implications in the publishing industry in general and the business of vanity
publishing in particular. Even without a final judgment, the three-and-ahalf million dollar punitive damages verdict in Stellema will encourage
all vanity publishers to tone down their advertising, promotional
brochures and contract documents. Any vanity publisher that continues
to hold itself out as an equivalent of a conventional trade publisher is at
risk of a similar claim for fraud. And once the vanity publisher makes it
clear that it is not much more than a "book manufacturing service," then
the author in search of a publisher may turn elsewhere.
Of course, it is also true that the Stellema settlement may actually
deter further litigation by authors who fall under the spell of vanity publishing. The fact that the case rattled around the courts for so many
years-and ended on such an ambiguous note-is hardly encouraging to
attorneys who may be approached by potential plaintiffs in a new lawsuit
against a vanity press. Further, although Stellema is readily distinguishable from Zilg and the related line of contract cases, the Stellema verdict
only reinforces the fundamental notion that a publisher, regardless of the
express language of its contracts, owes certain specific duties to its authors. In that sense, the verdict in Stellema goes even further than Zilg
in establishing that the very term "publisher" implies a minimum effort
toward commercial exploitation of a book, and amounts to a warning
shot across the bow of any publisher that fails to act in good faith in
acquiring, editing, and marketing the work of an author.
Above all, the Stellema case underscores the distinction between
vanity publishing and self-publishing, and thereby enhances the stature
of the self-published author and the independent publishing industry. Indeed, the publicity that surrounded Stellema-and the effects of Stellema
on the advertising claims of vanity publishers-will only encourage the
aspiring author to forego the vanity press and undertake the ancient and
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honorable enterprise of self-publication, an enterprise that will place him
in the company of not only Tolstoy but also Walt Whitman, Mark

Twain, Rudyard Kipling, James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, and even Rich41
ard Nixon.

1

141. POYNTER, supra note 1, at 24.

